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Introduction 
In May 2017, United States President Donald J Trump traveled to his first annual meeting of NATO 
heads of states in Brussels. The apprehension preceding the visit over what President Trump would 
say was quickly confirmed. As was widely reported at that time, Trump’s address to the allies made 
no mention of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Instead, he emphasized the demand that the allies 
dedicate a higher share of their GDP to defense. Trump reminded them that "23 of the 28 member 
nations are still not paying what they should be paying and what they are supposed to be paying." 
Moreover, he warned, they owed the United States "massive amounts" of money from previous 
years (Rucker, DeYoung, and Birnbaum 2017). 
Although hardly unexpected given the views President Trump expressed on NATO during his election 
campaign, he caused considerable anxiety among the European allies as well as many American 
observers, who wondered about America’s commitment to the alliance. Former US ambassador to 
NATO, Ivo Daalder, wrote that “after calling Nato ‘obsolete’ Trump needed to say what every 
predecessor since Truman has said: the US is committed to article 5. He didn’t. This is a major blow 
to the alliance,” adding that, “unfortunately, Nato today is more divided than ever.” (Borger 2017)  
Thomas Wright, the director of the Centre on the United States and Europe at the Brookings 
Institution, argued that the speech was “a policy failure of epic proportions,” increasing the risk that 
the Russians would test President Trump in the coming years (Borger 2017).  Perhaps most tellingly, 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel publicly announced that the Europeans would have to “take our 
fate into our own hands” in the absence of American and British leadership, because “the times in 
which we could completely depend on others are, to a certain extent, over.” (Henley 2017) 
Despite President Trump’s subsequent clarification that the United States would uphold Article 5, 
the initial omission still resonated across the alliance.  While a sense of a crisis is anything but new in 
the relationship between the United States and Europe, President Trump’s words seem to be more 
radical than ever. And yet, as we argue in this article, following his rhetoric may give a misleading 
picture of the state of the alliance. Since its inception, NATO has led to the formation of trusting 
relationships based on the underlying expectations of obligations and reciprocity. These trusting 
relationships are not only vital to the proper functioning of the alliance, but alliances are unique 
venues to build and sustain trusting relationships between states exactly because of the explicit 
roles obligation and reciprocity play in them.   
Thus, rather than downplaying the transatlantic link, President Trump’s demands reinforce our claim 
for the existence of deeply embedded trusting relationships between the allies. And he is not alone 
in these demands. Former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has equally argued that 
European allies need to invest more in ‘smart defense’ with a focus on working together to gain 
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greater flexibility, as “an alliance that brings Europe and North America together requires an 
equitable sharing of the burden ...” (Rasmussen 2011, 5-6)   
While it might be difficult to credit President Trump with knowingly and strategically reasserting the 
need for reciprocity based on obligations that are central to trusting relationships in the alliance, the 
underlying message is clear: NATO cannot survive unless commitments derived from the alliance are 
met by all, or at the very least most, of its members. The problem is therefore only partly the 
undiplomatic rhetoric of the current American president, because the rhetoric itself echoes a central 
U.S. concern about obligation and reciprocity: the unwillingness or the inability of the European 
allies to act in such way that would sustain the existing trusting relationships.  
Trust in Military Alliances  
Yves Boyer (2014, 69) has noted that “alliances are first and foremost about confidence, trust and 
protection.” Although few would probably dissent from this characterization, it raises two obvious 
questions. First, what exactly are we talking about when referring to trust among allies? Second, 
how does trust come about in military alliances and what, on the other hand, undermines it?  
Most of the scholarly writing on alliances has steered clear of these questions, because the 
dominant assumption has been that alliances are marriages of convenience lasting only so long as 
they pay off for the states involved. In other words, scholars tend to focus mainly on the protection 
element of Boyer’s characterization, at the expense of trust. That the allies could actually build 
something like a trusting relationship is either overlooked or outright dismissed. We believe that we 
should consider Boyer’s statement in its entirety; ignoring the importance of trust for alliances is a 
grave mistake. 
Following from our previous work on the subject, we conceive of trust as an ideational structure that 
allows actors to put aside risk and uncertainty which are inherent to any interaction between states 
(Keating and Ruzicka 2014). In the alliance setting, the key risks have been identified long ago by 
Glenn Snyder as the dilemmas of abandonment and entrapment (Snyder 1984). When allies form 
trusting relationships they cognitively neglect or downplay these two dilemmas, despite the fact that 
the possibility of defection never goes away.  As a consequence, instead of hedging against the 
potential defection of their allies, for instance, by overinvesting in their own independent military 
capabilities, they can devote their resources to more productive uses.  
Trusting relationships do not form automatically among allies.  Actors need to assess each other's 
trustworthiness. Such assessments have both a rational and a social component.1  The rational 
component involves calculating trust as the probability that a state is likely to be trustworthy, which, 
in the case of alliances, tends to revolve around whether states will fulfil their alliance commitments. 
Most rationalist scholars argue that these estimates are based on prior observation of states’ 
behavior through a Bayesian method, whereby expectations are adjusted upwards or downwards 
based on a state’s previous record of cooperation or defection.  
Though an inescapable element in understanding trust, we argue that a purely rational assessment 
of trust within an alliance setting is not sufficient. To it, we must add a social component of trust, 
                                                          
1 For the different theoretical perspectives on trust in international politics, see (Ruzicka and Keating 2015) 
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where states base their judgments on social factors such as group membership, common values, 
pre-existing social norms, and working towards common goals (Rousseau et al. 1998, 399, Hurley 
2011, 30, Parsons 1969, 336-337, Keating and Thrandardottir 2017). Actors tend to trust others with 
whom they are in a social alignment more than those with whom they are not. These social 
characteristics, when present, allow actors to overdraw on the existing information, the rational 
component, to cognitively discount any potential negative consequences that could arise from the 
mutual interaction.    
While the way in which trust is assessed is reasonably understandable, how trusting relationships 
can come about in alliances is neither straightforward nor inevitable. States remain sovereign actors 
that cannot be forced to trust - but they have the option to do so. As we will argue in an upcoming 
edited monograph (Keating and Ruzicka), there are three factors that make trusting relationships 
more likely within alliances: the specific obligations that a formal military alliance creates (for 
example, coming to each other’s aid), the expectations that these obligations will be met, and the 
ongoing opportunities to reciprocate within the alliance structure.2 These important structural 
characteristics of alliances enable their members to not only gauge trustworthiness in ways that are 
simply not available to them when taking the measure of non-allies, but also to forge and reinforce a 
sense of common values, rules, and goals.  
Reciprocity is thus one of the defining features of alliances when it comes to trust. Obligations, 
outlined by the treaty forming the alliance and those developed through the course of interaction 
among allies, are accompanied by the expectation that the other states will fulfil them, even when it 
might be temporarily inconvenient for them to do so. Meeting these duties repeatedly strengthens 
the assessments of both rational and social components of trustworthiness. From a rationalist 
account of trust, meeting obligations provides positive information that is then used to calculate the 
probability of an ally meeting their obligation in future. From a social account of trust, meeting 
duties reinforces the signal that the group is still working together towards common goals under a 
set of common values.  When allies do not reciprocate and do not meet the shared expectations, 
trusting relationships will deteriorate and may even collapse. The failure to live up to alliance 
commitments, norms and obligations is best seen as negative information about the trustworthiness 
of the actor and also potentially signals a break in a presumed set of shared goals and values.     
Reciprocity in NATO  
NATO is a highly unequal alliance in terms of the size, power, and relative conventional military 
vulnerability of its individual member states. Not all states in the alliance are thus required to 
contribute the same amount to collective defense. Nevertheless, over the course of the alliance’s 
existence, the allies developed a norm whereby states should all contribute 2% of their GDP to 
defense. The figure was originally adopted by NATO states in 2002 (Mölling 2014, 1), and reaffirmed 
as a target in 2014, when it was accepted as a goal that all allies should reach by 2024. The 2% 
expenditure pledge, though not legally binding, was seen as a historic step in formalizing the idea of 
burden sharing among the members (Techau 2015). 
                                                          
2 For earlier considerations of trust and trust-building within alliances, see (Keating 2015) 
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The norm of 2% spending has been formalized at a point in the history of the alliance characterized 
by simultaneous decreases in European defense spending and increases in the defense spending of 
the United States. Since the end of the Cold War, the European NATO states have cut their defense 
spending by almost 20% during a period when their GDP grew on average 55%. As a result, the 
European share of defense expenditures in NATO taken as a whole has fallen from 34% in 1991 to 
21% in 2011 (Rasmussen 2011, 3).   
While we wish to focus on what the 2% figure tells us about the state of trusting relationships, the 
existing literature generally understands the 2% figure through the lens of burden sharing.  Burden 
sharing within NATO has traditionally referred to as the transatlantic bargain, where U.S. defense 
commitment to the allies is matched by European contributions towards their own defense (Cooper 
and Zycher 1989, 2). The cost of membership, which produces the gain of the mutual protection 
offered by NATO, is to make financial contributions to the common infrastructure used by the 
alliance (Hartley and Sandler 1999, 666).  The precise nature and extent of these contributions was 
unclear at the beginning of the alliance, but several different targets spanning multiple areas have 
been suggested throughout its history (Cooper and Zycher 1989, 3, Sandler and Shimizu 2014, 45-47, 
Tonelson 2000, 31-38).  
Burden sharing within NATO has always been contentious because, as Charles Cooper and Benjamin 
Zycher (1989, 1) put it, “defense is expensive, democracies always face budget pressures, politicians 
are disposed to argue that allies are not doing their fair share, and diplomats are equally disposed to 
hope that the problem will go away if nobody talks about it.”  In general, the United States has long 
argued that it carries a disproportionate amount of the alliance burden, while the European allies 
pointed out that much of the US spending is on non-European concerns. They also stress that they 
make disproportionately high contributions towards NATO infrastructure or UN peacekeeping 
missions (Sandler and Murdoch 2000, 299). NATO has historically lacked a detailed burden-sharing 
regime, which has left room for contention over what should be considered fair contribution. At the 
same time, however, the very arguments that NATO constantly has over the meaning of equitable 
and fair contribution suggests that there is a unified social understanding of reciprocity as a central 
element of the alliance.   
While most of the scholarship has viewed the 2% number through this burden-sharing lens, we wish 
to appropriate it to demonstrate the importance of reciprocity and obligation in maintaining trusting 
relationships in the alliance context. Seen from this perspective, despite the rhetoric of President 
Trump regarding the obsolescence of NATO and his delay in openly supporting Article 5, the actions 
of the United States over the past number of years speak to a state that is actively signaling its intent 
to make good on its alliance obligations.3  Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the 
prolonged crisis in eastern Ukraine caused by Russian-backed separatists, the United States has 
significantly increased its spending in the European theatre (Ruzicka 2015). In an effort to 
simultaneously reassure its allies and deter Russia, the United States has moved both personnel and 
material to Europe on a scale not seen since the end of the Cold War.  
                                                          
3 This reinforces an idea we put forward in a previous paper, which argues for a prioritization of the behavioral 
manifestations of trusting relationships over discursive manifestations, see (Keating and Ruzicka 2014) 
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In 2015 alone, the United States implemented troop rotations to the front-line European allies at the 
cost of nearly $1 billion (Doran 2015, 259). The ensuing European Reassurance Initiative allocated $4 
billion to increase the number of U.S. Brigade Combat Teams in Europe from two to three and added 
another airborne brigade. Additionally, the United States permanently pre-positioned equipment for 
another brigade in Europe, should it be necessary (Sokolsky 2017, 3).    
Alongside the American efforts to counter the Russian threat, the alliance as a whole adopted a 
number of measures designed to reinforce the political and military commitment to the states on 
the eastern flank. This included the adoption of the Readiness Action Plan to increase NATO’s 
deterrent posture, and a reaffirmation of the 2% pledge by the member states. This pledge can be 
seen both as a costly signal, a typical example of rationalist mechanism to explain trust (Fearon 
1994, Kydd 2000, 326), and signal of obligation and reciprocity in the face of the U.S. investments 
into the alliance. However, within the NATO setting it is more significant that states do not see the 
need to establish any formal oversight mechanisms and are content to rely on the trusting 
relationships they have established among themselves. In other words, the way the members have 
gone about the 2% commitment, particularly with respect to the lack of direct hedging against the 
possibility that one or more allies will defect, suggests a reasonably high level of trust among the 
allies.4  
Our argument here is simply that the focus on the 2% figure should not be seen as another case of 
the United States attempting to shift the balance of alliance burdens. Far more is at stake. After all, 
there are “a thousand different ways” to evaluate alliance burden sharing, and the 2% figure has 
been criticized for being both arbitrary and nonsensical as a target to promote the proper 
functioning of the alliance (Mattelaer 2016, 26-27, Mölling 2014, Techau 2015). Instead, we argue 
that the 2% pledge should be understood as a call for reciprocity, a reminder to the other allies that 
NATO is based on reciprocal relationships, and that this signal of reciprocity helps to maintain 
trusting relationships that stabilize the alliance and help it to function more efficiently.  
Conclusion  
Words matter in international politics. If it were otherwise, there would hardly have been much 
concern over President Trump’s statements and what they might mean to the future of NATO. 
However, we propose that observers and practitioners should look beyond the immediate rhetoric, 
which is admittedly controversial, and try to understand these claims through the lens of the trusting 
relationships that the alliance has helped to establish. In that light, it becomes apparent that the 
rhetoric is not simply about who is spending what, but an attempt to maintain the sense of 
obligation and mutual reciprocity that build and support trusting relationships, without which the 
alliance would have much more difficulty operating. In short, living up to verbally made 
commitments is just as important as addressing one’s allies without insulting them or raising doubts 
about the mutual obligations. 
For NATO, like for any military alliance, the problem has always been whether it can survive the 
moment when the payoff structure of mutual cooperation changes. Trusting relationships, which 
                                                          
4 For a more detailed explanation of the relationship between trust and hedging, see (Keating and Ruzicka 
2014) 
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should not be confused with a harmony of interests, forged over the decades of NATO’s existence 
enable the allies to mitigate this problem, because they need not worry about relative gains and 
they can rely on allies to reciprocate the alliance obligations where politically possible. In the 
absence of trust, the NATO allies might have to begin to hedge increasingly against the possibility of 
American retreat from basic alliance commitments, as implied by Angela Merkel’s reaction. This 
could, in turn, lead to a spiral of distrust where less and less emphasis is placed on acting like an 
alliance, while more and more emphasis is placed on ensuring each state’s individual security. 
Needless to say, this would be a sub-optimal outcome for all states concerned. Irrespective of 
whether his statements were either knowledgeable or intentional, President Trump’s comments are 
important not simply as a request for more money, but as a reminder to everyone in the alliance 
that the reciprocity and the obligations on which it is based continue to make NATO’s existence 
possible.  
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